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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate factors influencing the underwriting 
discount for US Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs). 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The study provides new evidence on determinants of 
underwriting discounts with a comprehensive dataset of 783 US REIT SEOs from 1996 until 
June 2010. Ordinary least squares regressions are performed to estimate the effect of the level 
of representative underwriting along with other potential factors on underwriting discounts. 
 
Findings – The study complements the well-documented notion of the economies of scale in 
SEO underwriting discounts. The equally (value) weighted underwriting discounts averaged 
4.21 per cent (4.10 per cent) with a declining trend over time. The findings of this study show 
the statistically and economically significant negative effect of the level of representative 
underwriting on the underwriting discounts, as well as the significance of the structure of 
underwriting syndicate in determining the underwriting discounts. The findings suggest that 
issuers can minimize the costs of raising secondary equity capital by optimally allocating the 
underwriting business among the underwriters. 
 
Originality/value – This paper adds to the international REIT SEO literature by exploring 
new evidence behind underwriting discounts. The study includes data before and after the 
REIT Modernization Act 1999 and during the recent global financial crisis period. 
Keyword(s): 
United States of America; Equity capital; Underwriting; Costs; Real estate; Investments; 
Seasoned equity offerings; Underwriting syndicate; Level of underwriting; Underwriting 
discount. 
1 Introduction 
The direct costs of issuing seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) reduce the net proceeds to the 
issuing firm. A major portion of the SEO direct costs is the underwriting discount, 76 per cent 
of total direct costs (Lee et al., 1996), which is the remuneration directly paid to the 
investment banks involved in floating the offerings from valuation to hiring dealers. This 
underwriting discount is also often refereed to as the “gross spread”. This underwriting cost 
broadly ranges from 3 to 8 per cent of SEO gross proceeds (Lee and Masulis, 2009) but 
Butler et al. (2005) report a range from 1 to 10 per cent. Unlike initial public offerings 
(IPOs), which experience clustering at certain percentages, SEOs experience modest 
clustering of underwriting costs with substantial cross-sectional variation but very little was 
known about the determinants of these costs for SEOs until Butler et al. (2005). Lee and 
Masulis (2009) suggest asymmetric information between managers and outside investors to 
have a positive effect on these costs. The literature on underwriting costs is, however, mainly 
centered on IPOs (Chen and Ritter, 2000; Torstila, 2001; Hansen, 2001; Butler and Huang, 
2003; Kaserer and Kraft, 2003) and SEOs (Smith, 1977; Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Lee et al., 
1996; Corwin, 2003; Mola and Loughran, 2004; Butler et al., 2005; Lee and Masulis, 2009) 
of industrial companies. 
Real estate investment trusts (REITs) which are entirely engaged in real estate properties with 
relatively certain income from rent and mortgage payments have proved a very active sector 
in the capital market during last two decades (Ghosh et al., 2000; Laopodis, 2009). Over the 
last five years their daily trading volume has increased by 163 per cent and during first six 
months of 2010 their dividend yield has more than doubled the dividend yield of S&P500 
(REITWATCH, July 2010). It is worth mentioning that during this same six-month period the 
REIT index experienced a 5.56 per cent gain against a 6.65 per cent loss for the S&P500. The 
significance of REIT SEOs in the capital market is also worth noting because during this six-
month period, the industry raised $22 billion in total, $9.8 billion of which was raised by 
secondary equity and preferred offerings against $1.3 billion by IPOs. Additionally, because 
of hardly any tax-based incentives, REITs need to issue frequent SEOs in comparison to 
industrial companies to fund their growth opportunities. Hence, costs of raising secondary 
equity capital by REITs are significant factor to their capital budgeting decision but there is a 
paucity of study on the determinants of REIT SEO underwriting costs. The purpose of this 
study is to investigate the determinants of underwriting costs of REIT SEOs and more 
specifically the effect of the level of representative underwriting on underwriting costs. 
The rationale behind this lies in the idea that offers size and underwriter reputation, among 
others, are significant determinants of SEO underwriting costs but the empirical evidence of 
the effect of lead underwriter's reputation on the underwriting costs is somewhat mixed[1]. 
Mola and Loughran (2004) report the prior market share, reputation and quality of analyst 
group of an investment bank to influence most of its subsequent underwriting business in 
seasoned offerings. Butler et al. (2005) assume investment banks with better reputations have 
a larger market share. Despite the mixed effect on underwriting costs, the empirical evidence 
shows that the underwriter reputation affects the underwriting business of an underwriter. 
This led us to hypothesize that the representative underwriting banks (including the lead 
underwriter) may well influence the size of their remuneration. This paper addresses this 
issue by relating the level of the active participation of the representative underwriters in an 
offer, to their compensation. We test the significance of the level of active participation by 
the representative underwriters with a sample of 783 US REIT SEOs from a period of 
January 1996 until June 2010 and find a statistically significant and robust negative effect on 
underwriting costs. 
We hypothesize that the underwriters emphasize on both their reputation and the level of their 
volume of shares in an offer in determining their compensation. We also hypothesize that the 
underwriters with higher reputation but lower proportion of shares in an offer demand higher 
compensation. The rationale behind this lies in the fact that an offer is usually underwritten 
either by a single underwriter or a syndicate of underwriters, with a few of them acting as 
lead managers and or representatives. The offer prospectus states the underwriting structure 
with the name and the respective volume of each underwriter along with the name of the 
underwriter who will lead and represent the underwriting syndicate. We have used the 
percentage of underwriting by the representative underwriters because they underwrite a 
relatively large portion (81 per cent in our case) of the offer and sometimes both lead and 
representative underwriters equally underwrite the offer. Lead underwriters are always 
included in the list of representative underwriters and they may need to incur some sunk costs 
in seeking out investors and processing transactions. As their costs are similar to other market 
makers, they enjoy some economies of scale with volume. Hence, they may take into account 
both the uncertainty of the pricing of the offer and the level of underwriting in the offer to 
reap the benefit of economies of scale. As such, they tend to underwrite a larger portion of 
the more certain offers and vice versa. Thus, if the underwriters with higher reputations are 
offered a relatively small proportion in the offer, they may not be able to make a competitive 
remuneration from such offer and hence they need a higher underwriting compensation. 
Alternatively, if the representative underwriters consider the offer to have less uncertainty in 
its pricing, they compete to raise their underwriting proportion/level and demand lower 
compensation. 
This study is significant because it sheds light on the determinants of REIT SEO underwriting 
discount and more specifically on the level of active underwriting by the representative 
underwriters. Interestingly, Chen and Lu (2006) report equally (value) weighted underwriting 
gross spreads of 6.78 per cent (6.56 per cent) for 197 US REIT IPOs over 1980-1999 and this 
study with 783 REIT SEOs over 1996-2010 reports equally (value) weighted underwriting 
costs of 4.21 per cent (4.10 per cent). The SEOs are likely to offer lower uncertainty about 
their future cash flows and with the established secondary market record are likely to need a 
lower marketing effort. As such, underwriting costs for REIT SEOs would be expected to be 
lower than for REIT IPOs. The study incorporates the effects of REIT Modernization Act 
1999 and the post-global financial crisis (GFC) period. The study reports the significant 
negative effect of the level of representative underwriting on underwriting discount of REIT 
SEOs. It also reports that the effect of the level of representative underwriting is well 
pronounced for offers with lower relative offer sizes, larger offer size, higher offer prices and 
top-ranked underwriters. The study further investigates the factors influencing the level of 
representative underwriting. 
The study contributes to the REIT literature in four ways. First, this paper is the first to our 
knowledge, to provide the direct underwriting costs of raising equity by US REIT SEOs. 
Second, it investigates the effect of the level of representative underwriting on underwriting 
costs. Third, it investigates some of the other determinants of SEO underwriting costs. 
Fourth, it identifies the factors significantly influencing the level of representative 
underwriting. The study will benefit both the issuers and the underwriters in determining 
underwriting discount. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a review of relevant 
literature, while Section 3 outlines the data and methodological design of the study. Section 4 
deals with some summary statistics, the main empirical results along with some robustness 
tests. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the findings and concludes with some implications. 
 
 
2 Literature 
 
While IPOs are often used to fund the initial public growth of firms, SEOs are used to raise 
secondary external equity capital to fund subsequent growth for these publicly traded firms. 
Additionally, in contrast to industrial companies, which can fund their growth through 
retained earnings and debt financing, REIT firms have hardly any retained earnings and also 
get hardly any tax-based incentives to raise debt capital (Ghosh et al., 2000). Owing to this 
limitation, REIT firms find the equity capital market as a useful means to raise much needed 
capital by issuing comparatively frequent SEOs compared to their industrial entity 
counterparts. 
To issue an SEO however, the issuing firm hires investment banks to facilitate the entire 
issuing process from valuation to hiring dealers to collecting subscriber applications. The 
investment banks or underwriters bear the inventory risk of having to take shares not sold and 
the litigation risk of defending against possible lawsuits from disgruntled investors or even 
issuers. The investment banks or banking group may incur some sunk costs in seeking out the 
investors and processing the whole transaction. They also need to pay for dealers or brokers 
who ultimately sell the shares to the investors. 
Issuing firms need to compensate the investment banks for assuming inventory risk, valuing 
shares, litigation risk, incurring sunk costs, paying for dealer-brokers and also for their 
reputation and expertise. This compensation varies across industries and even countries. For 
industrial company IPOs, it is well documented to cluster at round percentages across firm 
size (Chen and Ritter, 2000; Hansen, 2001) and even across countries (Torstila, 2003). Butler 
et al. (2005) report a modest clustering of SEO gross fees on round percentages. These gross 
fees mainly depend on the underwriting syndicate structure and the bargaining capacity of 
both the underwriter(s) representing the syndicate and the managers of the issuing firm. The 
underwriting syndicate originates with the appointment of a bookrunning manager or lead 
underwriter by the issuers who usually emphasize on the general reputation, prior market 
share, research support/analyst quality, industry knowledge of the underwriter and the prior 
relationships with the issuer in appointing an underwriter as the bookrunning manager. 
Subsequent to the appointment of the bookrunning manager, issuers appoint co-managers 
from those competing for the position of bookrunning manager and even they sometimes 
consider the advice of bookrunning manager in selecting the co-manager. Bookrunning 
managers typically underwrite a substantially large portion of the offer. The allocations for 
co-managing syndicate members are usually decided upfront and for other non-managing 
members the distributions are solely dependent on the discretion of the bookrunning manager 
who usually finalize the allocations at the due diligence meeting a few days prior to the offer 
becoming effective (Corwin and Schultz, 2005). The other non-managing underwriters are 
selected by both the issuer and the bookrunning manager. Corwin and Schultz (2005) report 
IPO share allocations roughly 40, 40 and 20 per cent among book managers, co-managers 
and other non-managing underwriters, respectively. Mola and Loughran (2004) report nearly 
72 per cent of SEO proceeds were underwritten with top-tier bankers. Ljungqvist et al. (2006) 
and Ljungqvist et al. (2009) suggest that issuers consider the prior market share of the 
underwriters in appointing the bookrunning manager and underwriters tend to provide 
aggressive analysts coverage to win co-manager designation. 
Underwriters in the syndicate play different roles including information production, 
certification and underwriter reputation, analyst coverage and market making (Corwin and 
Schultz, 2005). These roles in the syndicate are competitive and may become fierce for large 
offers because being a co-manager in an offer raises their chance of becoming a book 
manager in follow-on offerings. To reduce future underwriting competition and potential 
conflicts among themselves, the bookrunning manager tends to confine the syndicate size. 
Bookrunning managers can do this because managers of issuing firms emphasize on the 
strength of the underwriters who can aggressively talk up their stock (Mola and Loughran, 
2004). After getting appointed, the bookrunning manager can conduct the road shows under 
bookbuilding process to spread the opinion of the potential investors (Huang and Zhang, 
2011). 
After completion of the road show, along with setting the final offer price, the bookrunning 
manager negotiates for underwriting fees that are apportioned among bookrunning managers, 
co-managers and non-managing members according to the role of each group in the 
syndicate. Specifically, these fees consist of management fees, underwriting fees and selling 
concessions. Management fees are apportioned among bookrunning managers and co-
managers, with the bookrunning manager retaining the larger portion due to their due 
diligence services. Underwriting fees are shared among syndicate members proportionately to 
the shares underwritten and finally the selling concessions are distributed according to the 
selling loads[2]. In each segment of the fees, bookrunning managers get a lion's portion of the 
spread and particularly the lead bookrunning manager. As the proportion of shares 
underwritten is a key determinant in allocations of all segments of spreads, the proportion of 
shares underwritten by the key underwriters becomes an instrument of bargaining. Even 
though the underwriting competition may have been strongly competitive, the lead 
bookrunning manager with aggressive analyst bankers enjoys the major bargaining power. 
However, the bargaining strength regarding fees depends on the strength of both the 
concerned bookrunning manager and the characteristics of the issue. 
The previous literature on industrial SEOs shows a downward trend of underwriting discount. 
For example, Smith (1977) reports 6.17 per cent, Eckbo and Masulis (1992) 6.09 per cent, 
Lee et al. (1996) 5.44 per cent, Corwin (2003) 5.40 per cent, Mola and Loughran (2004) 5.10 
per cent, Butler et al. (2005) 4.80 per cent and Lee and Masulis (2009) 5.09 per cent. Lee et 
al. (1996) and Butler et al. (2005) report some economies of scale in SEO underwriting 
discounts are noticeable. 
As institutional investors tend to shun low-priced stocks (Butler et al., 2005), representative 
underwriters may tend to underwrite higher stock price issues. Underwriters also consider 
relative offer size which is the ratio of the offer size and firm size the day before the offer and 
measures both the uncertainty (Mola and Loughran, 2004) and the relative capacity of the 
market to absorb the firm's offer (Butler et al., 2005). Underwriters might face difficulty in 
placing offers with higher relative offer sizes and demand higher compensation for such 
offers. Owing to the lower uncertainty (Kutsuna et al., 2008) and higher demand by 
institutional investors (Butler et al., 2005) for issues with higher offer price, we expect offer 
price to negatively affect underwriting discount. The higher ranked underwriters are 
associated with larger and more certain offers and may work harder to make the offer 
successful. The effect of underwriter reputation on underwriting discount is mixed in the 
literature. For example, Carter and Dark (1990) report a negative relationship whereas Butler 
et al. (2005) find a positive effect on underwriting discount. The number of total underwriters 
in the syndicate is reported to have negative effect on underwriting compensation due to its 
successful distributional effect (Carter and Dark, 1990) and better coordination (Butler et al., 
2005). In contrast to Carter and Dark (1990), we argue for a positive effect of the number of 
both representative and total underwriters on the underwriting discount because a higher 
number of underwriters reduces the underwriting business for each underwriter and 
simultaneously positively affects coordination complexities. 
The SEOs of entities listed in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) are associated with the 
lower level of uncertainty (Mola and Loughran, 2004; Butler et al., 2005) due to its broader 
shareholder base. Firms with recent prior SEOs can reduce the problem of asymmetric 
information by disseminating information during that issue. This complements the leaving a 
good taste hypothesis (Mola and Loughran, 2004) that investors can remember about the 
performance of the recent past issue. Hence, underwriters might demand a lower discount to 
place the offer for the firm with the recent past SEO because they might need less effort to 
place such offers. As the hiring of quality auditors reduces the uncertainty (Beatty, 1989), we 
expect a lower underwriting discount for offers audited by an industry-differentiated auditor 
(Wang and Wilkins, 2007). 
The interest rate on fixed income securities is closely related with the dividend yield of REIT 
securities. During a higher level of interest rates, underwriters might face difficulty in 
attracting investors. Hence, due to the “yield effect” (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997) we can 
expect a positive relationship between the treasury interest rate and underwriting discount. 
Howe and Jain (2004) report reduced systematic risk and lower dividend payout requirements 
after implementation of REIT Modernization Act 1999 in 2001. The reduced payout 
requirement of the Act is expected to raise the bargaining strength of the issuer. Owing to the 
higher bargaining strength of the issuer and the reduced systematic risk of the issue, we 
expect underwriters to demand a lower discount for post-2000 SEOs. Underwriters might, 
however, face difficulty in placing the offer after the recent GFC which burst in late 2007 
(Valentine and Gordon, 2009) and is attributed to the sharp downturn of housing prices 
(Laopodis, 2009). As such, we expect the post-GFC SEO issuers to pay different 
underwriting discounts to the underwriters. 
3 Data and method 
This study is primarily based on data stated in the prospectuses of all REIT SEOs issued and 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ as reported in the National Association of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) historical offering records and in the Securities 
Exchange Commission's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) 
archives over the period January 1996 until June 2010. The sampling period is from January 
1996 to capture the effect of widespread subprime real estate mortgage lending that started in 
the mid-1990s (Sanders, 2008). The year-wise offerings of REIT SEOs have been tabulated 
from the historical SEOs of securities of NAREITs as reported in the NAREIT historical 
offerings archives till July 2010. Our final sample includes 783 out of 1,295 total SEOs 
issued by 197 different REITs after excluding offers that are issued by parties other than the 
REIT itself, like the issues underwritten by placement agents and issued by selling 
shareholders. A total of 51 REITs issued an SEO once, 30 REITs – three times, 29 – two 
times, 25 – four times, 21 – five times, eight – six and seven times, six – nine times, five – 12 
and 13 times, four – eight times, two – 11 times and one – ten, 15 and 17 times. 
All REIT SEO prospectuses have been sourced from EDGAR. This source has been keeping 
the SEC filings of all US-based publicly listed and traded companies since 1996 and used as a 
source in a number of studies[3]. 
Underwriting discount, lead and representative underwriters, level of representative 
underwriting, number of representative underwriters, the name of the listing exchange and the 
name of the auditors who audited the financial statements in the prospectuses have been hand 
collected and compiled from respective SEO prospectuses. The direct underwriting discount 
has been scaled by the total proceeds raised to derive a percentage of gross proceeds. 
Reputation rank for lead underwriters has been compiled as per Carter and Manaster (1990) 
as updated in Ritter's homepage (http//bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/Rank.xcl). Following Carter and 
Dark (1990) lead underwriters' rank has been averaged where there are multiple lead 
underwriters. The ten-year treasury interest rate is sourced from Bloomberg. In calculating 
the value-weighted amount, the amount of offer proceeds is expressed with 2009 purchasing 
power using the US GDP price deflator. 
Methodology 
We use the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression specifications with percentage of 
underwriting discount as dependent variable in the first equation to investigate its significant 
determinants. The second dependent variable investigated is the percentage of the SEO's 
shares underwritten by the representative underwriters. The OLS specifications used are as 
follows: Equation 1 Equation 2 where UNDDISC is the underwriting discount directly paid 
to the underwriters as a percentage of proceeds raised and REPUNDWRITING is the 
percentage of SEO offer underwritten by lead and or representative underwriters. Other 
variables are as defined in Table I. 
To test the robustness of factors influencing underwriting discount, we divide the sample into 
a subsample from 2001 to 2010. The sample period 2001-2010 is utilized because the REIT 
Modernization Act 1999 became effective from January 1, 2001 (Howe and Jain, 2004), the 
S&P500 stock index incorporated some REITs in its index in 2001 (Laopodis, 2009) and the 
GFC occurred during this period (Valentine and Gordon, 2009). We have also tested the 
robustness by dividing the sample into a further two subsamples based on the level of 
representative underwriting of less than 1 and equal to 1. 
4 Summary statistics 
In Table II, we present the summary statistics of variables (defined in Table I) used in our 
regression specifications. The table shows the left-skewed underwriting discount which 
averaged 4.21 per cent. The underwriter rank and the level of representative underwriting are 
also left-skewed and averaged 7.86 and 81.36 per cent, respectively. Among other variables, 
SEO offer size (SEOAMOUNT ml $), offer price per share (OFFPRICE), relative offer size 
(RELOFF), ten-year treasury interest rate (TENYRTRSINT), number of representative 
underwriters (NUMREPUND) and number of total underwriters (NUMTOTUND) are all 
right-skewed and averaged $131.15 million, $24.44, 20.76 per cent, 4.79 per cent, 2.12 and 
5.92, respectively. The representative underwriters averaged nearly 36 per cent of total 
underwriters in the syndicate. 
The sample consists of 783 SEOs over January 1996 until June 2010 issued by 197 different 
REITs during this sample period. 
Table III reports the yearly and subperiod distribution of the sample, offer size, level of 
representative underwriting, relative offer, offer price per share and underwriting discounts of 
SEOs over the period from 1996 to 2010. Tables I and II delineate that the average (median) 
underwriting discount is 4.21 per cent (4.85 per cent). We have divided the sample period 
into three subperiods to identify any periodical trend in underwriting discount and it shows 
4.78 per cent for the period of 1996-2000 which is consistent with 4.80 per cent of Butler et 
al. (2005) and 5 per cent of Mola and Loughran (2004). The middle subperiod of our sample 
experienced the lowest underwriting discount. The level of representative underwriting 
experienced a constant downward trend from 90 to 70 per cent. The relative offer size is the 
lowest in the second subperiod and offer price higher in the third subperiod compared to that 
of first subperiod. The trend of underwriting discount is consistent with the trend of relative 
offer size. 
The sample consists of 783 SEOs over January 1996 until June 2010 out of 1,295 total SEOs 
issued by 197 different REITs during this sample period. The table consists of nine columns. 
The left most column is the year and three subperiods. The column total SEOs is the number 
of SEOs, the column sample SEOs is the number of SEOs in our sample, fourth column is the 
amount in million dollars at constant dollars in 2009 using US GDP growth rate, fifth column 
shows the amount raised in million dollars, sixth column underwriting discount is the 
discount or fees paid to the underwriters as percentage of amount raised, seventh column 
representative underwriting is the percentage of shares in the offer underwritten by the 
representative underwriters including lead underwriters, eighth column is the relative offer 
which is the offer volume with respect to firm size in terms of market capitalization or 
outstanding shares on the day before the offer and the last column is the offer price per share. 
The last row totals the second and third columns and then reports mean averages for the 
following six columns. 
Univariate results 
In Table IV, we present the univariate relationship of the level of representative underwriting 
with offer size (volume), underwriter rank, relative offer and offer price per share. Panel A 
presents the relationship with the full sample of 783 SEOs, Panel B with 359 SEOs and Panel 
C with 424 SEOs. The level of underwriting by the representative underwriters is 100 per 
cent in Panel B whereas it is less than 100 per cent in Panel C. In each panel each variable is 
divided into four quartiles from lowest to highest and the average underwriting discount is 
reported along with the difference and the level of statistical significance between the lowest 
and highest quartile. Panel A shows that the underwriting discount significantly declines in 
higher quartiles for offer size, underwriter rank, offer price and REPUNDWRITING but 
increases with the relative offer size. In sorting the quartile for the level of representative 
underwriting, we have used underwriter rank as the second-level condition because the 
REPUNDWRITING is 100 per cent for nearly 46 per cent of the sample. It shows that the 
difference in underwriting discount is zero for first two quartiles and it is apparently 
significant in the last two quartiles of REPUNDWRITING. In Panel B, the variable 
REPUNDWRITING is immaterial because its value is 100 per cent for all observations. In 
Panel C, the significance of the difference of underwriter rank is considered between first and 
third quartile because almost all observation in last two quartiles have the highest rank of 9. 
The significance of the underwriting discount in terms of the difference between the lowest 
and the highest quartile of REPUNDWRITING is marginal but consistent with our argument. 
Table IV presents the univariate relationship between some key explanatory variables and 
underwriting discount in Panel A with the full sample of 783 SEOs, in Panel B with 359 
SEOs having 100 per cent level of underwriting by representative underwriters, and in Panel 
C with 424 SEOs that have a level of underwriting less than 100 per cent. Each variable in 
the table is divided into four quartiles from lowest to highest and the average underwriting 
discount is reported along with the difference and the level of statistical significance between 
the lowest and highest quartile. 
Figure 1 shows the scatter plot of underwriting discount against the level of representative 
underwriting. While the figure depicts apparent clustering of the level of representative 
underwriting at 100 per cent, there exists substantial variation in underwriting discount for 
both less than 100 per cent and at 100 per cent level of their underwriting. It clearly depicts 
that other variables have influences on underwriting discount. To control the confounding 
effects of other variables, we run the OLS multivariate regressions in the next section. 
Figure 1 shows the scatter plot of underwriting discount for REIT SEOs against the level of 
representative underwriting with a full sample of 783 out of 1,295 SEOs issued by 197 
different REITs during the period of January 1996 to June 2010. Our sample discards SEOs 
underwritten by placement agents and issued by selling shareholders. Underwriting discount 
is the underwriting discount directly paid to the underwriters as a percentage of SEO 
proceeds and the representative underwriting is the percentage of offer underwritten by the 
representative underwriters. 
Empirical results 
Table V presents the OLS regression results of factors influencing underwriting discount of 
raising secondary equity capital by issuing REITs from January 1996 until June 2010 with 
total included being 783 SEOs. The table shows that all the variables except POSTGFC in all 
specifications are statistically significant and consistent with the predicted sign. The negative 
coefficient of REPUNDWRITING strongly supports that underwriters demand a lower 
discount when they get the higher level of underwriting business in the offer. To investigate 
whether underwriting fee and the level of underwriting might be determined simultaneously, 
we utilize a Hausman test to test whether the differences between two-stage least squares and 
OLS estimates are so large that the OLS estimates may not be consistent. The results of the 
test suggest that allowing the level of underwriting to be affected by the underwriting fee 
does not significantly alter the OLS coefficients reported in Table V. Consistent with Lee et 
al. (1996), the negative coefficient of LNSEOAMOUNT supports the economies of scale in 
REIT SEOs and is also consistent with Butler et al. (2005) and Bradley et al. (2006). The 
negative coefficient of LNOFFPRICE supports the intuition that the higher priced SEO 
stocks are easier to place in the market because the institutional investors who may be the 
major participant in the SEOs shun the low-priced stocks. This is also consistent with the 
greater certainty of the pricing of the offer (Kutsuna et al., 2008, p. 228). 
Our significant positive coefficient of RELOFF is consistent with the idea of higher 
uncertainty for SEOs with higher relative offer sizes. The intuition behind this is the higher 
proportion of shares offered relative to the shares outstanding creates more pressure in the 
market to absorb the offer (Corwin, 2003, p. 2254) and also uncertainty (Mola and Loughran, 
2004, p. 7). Investment banks either need more effort in marketing or suspect more inventory 
risk for such offers. As such, they might charge a higher underwriting discount for such 
offers and vice versa. This also complements Corwin (2003) that higher relative offer has a 
significantly positive influence on SEO underpricing. The negative coefficient of underwriter 
rank, UNDRANK, is consistent with the hypothesis that the higher ranked underwriters 
underwrite the larger and more certain offers and due to the economies of scale, they can 
charge lower underwriting fees (Carter and Dark, 1990). The number of representative 
underwriters is used to control for the level of required coordination in the syndicate. In 
contrast to the argument of reduced risk of successful distribution with the larger syndicate of 
Carter and Dark (1990), we argue that the larger and more uncertain offer hires a larger 
syndicate. The larger syndicate needs more representative underwriters to efficiently deal 
with the parties involved in the offer. As the representative underwriters assume more 
responsibility, the size of both the representative underwriters and the syndicate may have a 
positive effect on underwriting discount. In contrast to Carter and Dark (1990), the significant 
positive coefficient of the size of representative underwriters and also the total syndicate size, 
supports our argument (although not specifically reported here). The significant positive 
coefficient of the ten-year treasury interest rate (TENYRTRSINT) supports the notion that 
during a period of higher interest rates in fixed income securities, underwriters might face 
difficulty in attracting investors to SEO shares due to the “yield effect” (Ling and Ryngaert, 
1997). The negative coefficient of listing exchange (NYSE) justifies the broader investor 
base and confidence arguments. It also complements the lower underpricing of Corwin 
(2003) for SEOs listed in NYSE. The significant negative sign of POSTRMA is consistent 
with the higher bargaining strength of issuer after 2000. Consistent with our argument, the 
positive coefficient of POSTGFC, significant in one specification, might be attributed to the 
higher marketing uncertainty and required efforts of the underwriters during the post GFC 
period. The negative effect of both PRESEO and TOPAUDITOR might be attributed to the 
more available information and greater certainty, respectively, for offers which have recent 
past SEOs and which are audited by the auditor who has audited the largest volume of REIT 
SEOs during our sample period, respectively. The firms with the prior SEO should have less 
asymmetric information (Ghosh et al., 2000, p. 364) because the market is well familiar and 
can recall past information (Mola and Loughran, 2004). The firms audited by the top auditor 
reflect the greater reliability of their financial information. After controlling for these 
confounding effects on SEO underwriting discount, the negative significant coefficient of the 
level of representative underwriting strongly supports our conjecture that representative 
underwriters with the higher percentage of underwriting in the offer charge a lower 
underwriting discount to market the issue. As the underwriting process becomes more refined 
over time, the process may become cheaper and it is possible that SEO capital raising costs 
may be time dependent. Yearly dummies were tested but the key results remain consistent 
with only the POSTRMA variable remaining statistically significant. 
This table reports the OLS results of factors influencing the underwriting discounts paid by 
the issuers of 783 US REIT SEOs over the period from January 1996 until June 2010. The 
number of complete observations (n) is presented at the last row. The dependent variable is 
the underwriting discount, UNDDISC, as a percentage of total proceeds raised which 
averaged 4.21 per cent. Sample size declines in subsequent specifications after adjusting for 
missing data of variables used in the regressions. The results in the table are based on the 
following estimation. The other variables are as defined in Table I: Equation 3 ***, ** and * 
indicate the levels of significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity consistent coefficients and p-values are reported. 
Table VI depicts the sensitivity of REPUNDWRITING on underwriting discount. The table 
consists of four specifications. The average level of underwriting by representative 
underwriters including lead underwriters is 81 per cent and this level is 100 per cent for 46 
per cent of sample SEOs (359 of 783 SEOs). For rest of the 54 per cent sample SEOs (424 of 
783), the average level of representative underwriting is 66 per cent. To detect the sensitivity 
of this level of underwriting on underwriting discount, we have used a number of 
multiplicative dummy variables in all the specifications along with some control variables not 
highly correlated themselves. In specifications 1 and 2, the higher level of representative 
underwriting (DHIGHREPUND) is 100 per cent or 1 and for the next two specifications it is 
greater than or equal to 75 per cent or 0.75. In terms of sign, magnitude and statistical 
significance of the coefficients of variables used in Table VI, they are consistent in all the 
specifications. The results show that the coefficients of the multiplicative dummy of higher 
and lower representative underwriting with the dummy of offer price in the highest quartile, 
DHIGHREPUND*DHIGHOFFPRICE and DLOWREPUND*DHIGHOFFPRICE are both 
negative but significant in DHIGHREPUND*DHIGHOFFPRICE as predicted. It indicates 
that underwriters charge a lower underwriting discount for offers with both the higher offer 
price and the higher level of representative underwriting in the syndicate. The level of 
underwriting by the representative underwriters matters as is evident from the reduced 
economic significance in the last two specifications where the level of underwriting reduces 
from 1 to 0.75. Similarly, the coefficient of the next pair of multiplicative dummies show that 
underwriting discount is significantly lower for offers with both the higher offer size and the 
higher level of representative underwriting. It also indicates that underwriters charge lower 
compensation when the offer size is larger and their level of underwriting becomes higher. 
This is attributed to the higher certainty and economies of scale enjoyed by the representative 
underwriters for the larger offer size. The reduced economic and the statistical significance in 
the next two specifications indicates the significance of the level of representative 
underwriting. To test the significance of the relative offer, we have used dummies for highest 
and lowest quartile of relative offer size and multiplied by the higher level of representative 
underwriting. The estimated coefficients show that the offers with the relative offer in the 
highest quartile in all specifications are positive and statistically significant at 1 per cent 
whereas the coefficients of those with the relative offer in the lowest quartile are all negative 
and significant at 1 per cent. The significantly lower underwriting discount of offers with 
lower relative offer indicates that underwriters charge lower underwriting discount for offers 
with lower relative offer sizes and they charge a higher discount for offers with higher 
relative offer sizes. It shows that underwriters consider the relative uncertainty of the offer 
along with their level of underwriting in demanding their compensation. In the last two rows 
of multiplicative dummies, we have tested the sensitivity effect of the level of representative 
underwriting by controlling the rank of top underwriters. We argue that the top-ranked 
underwriters, ranked above a median rank of 8 in our sample, tend to underwrite relatively 
larger amounts of the offer and demand lower compensation. The estimated coefficients in 
first two specifications strongly support our argument. When the level of higher 
representative underwriting reduces from 1 to 0.75 with the lead underwriting rank remaining 
the same, the economical significance slightly reduces but remains significant at 1 per cent. 
This also supports our argument. 
Table VII presents the regression results of two subsamples of 424 and 359 SEOs with the 
level of representative underwriting less than 1 and equal to 1, respectively. The average 
underwriting discounts for these two subsamples are 4.67 and 3.66 per cent, respectively. The 
difference in average underwriting discount in these two subsamples apparently indicates that 
the SEOs with higher level of representative underwriting pay relatively lower compensation 
to the concerned underwriting syndicate. The table consists of six regression specifications. 
Specifications 1 to 3 are for the subsample with representative underwriting less than 1 and 
specifications 4 to 6 are for the subsample with representative underwriting equal to 1. The 
regression coefficient of REPUNDWRITING confirms that both the economic and statistical 
significance of the level of representative underwriting remain consistent after adjusting for 
other effects in the subsample of 424 SEOs with the level of REPUNDWRITING less than 1. 
To avoid the effect of multicollinearity problem of TENYRTRSINT with POSTGFC and 
POSTRMA, they are used interchangeably. 
The significant positive coefficient of RELOFF in specifications 4 and 5 strongly confirms 
our argument that offers with higher relative offer size and higher representative underwriting 
(100 per cent) pay a higher underwriting discount to the underwriters. Similarly, the 
significant negative coefficient of UNDRANK in specifications 4 and 5 also strongly 
confirms that representative underwriters demand a significantly lower underwriting discount 
for offers where the level of both their representative underwriting and lead underwriters' 
rank are relatively higher. The insignificant coefficients of listing exchange, NYSE and 
POSTGFC indicate that these are not significant factors to underwriters in demanding their 
compensation when they have higher level of underwriting in the offer. 
DHIGHSEAMOUNT is the dummy variable as defined and used here to control the effect of 
higher offer size. The result shows that its coefficients in both subsamples are significantly 
negative with higher significance in subsample with REPUNDWRITING<1. This is 
attributed to the larger offer size in this subsample, ($166ml against $90ml) and is also 
consistent with the conjecture of Mikkelson and Partch (1985) that low-volume stocks are 
less demand elastic. Similarly, the dummy variable DLOWSEOAMOUNT is positive but 
significant only in specification 6 due to this elasticity effect. The coefficients of offer price 
in the highest quartile, DHIGHOFFPRICE, are significant at 10 per cent in both subsamples 
but the economic significance is higher in the subsample with the level of 100 per cent 
representative underwriting where the average offer price is 33 per cent higher than that of 
representative underwriting less than 100 per cent ($28 against $21). The average relative 
offer size, RELOFF, in the subsample with representative underwriting less than 100 per cent 
is 26 per cent against 14 per cent in that with representative underwriting of 100 per cent. The 
higher economic magnitude of DHIGHRELOFF in specification 6 indicates that the 
representative underwriters who underwrite 100 per cent of the offer penalize the offers with 
higher relative offer size by demanding a higher underwriting discount than those where their 
level of underwriting is less than 100 per cent. It also shows that the level of representative 
underwriting is an inverse function of the relative offer size. The significant negative 
coefficient of DLOWRELOFF justifies the significance of the relative offer size in 
demanding the underwriting discount. The significant negative coefficient of 
DHIGHREPUND shows further the significance of the level of representative underwriting 
to top-ranked underwriters even when we divide the sample as per the level of representative 
underwriting. 
Table VIII presents the OLS regression results of a periodical subsample of 538 SEOs from 
January 2001 until June 2010. We have divided our sample into this period to test the 
consistency of the level of representative underwriting along with other control variables. The 
subsample is significant because the REIT Modernization Act 1999 became effective from 1 
January 2001 (Howe and Jain, 2004) and some REITs were first included in the S&P500 
index in 2001 (Laopodis, 2009, p. 563). These two are significant events for the REIT 
industry. However, the average underwriting discount for this subperiod is 3.95 per cent 
which is also relatively lower than that of our full sample (at 1 per cent significance). This 
relatively lower underwriting discount may well be attributed to the effects of these two 
events and it also justifies the dividing of the sample into this subperiod. 
In specification 3, the dummy variable DHIGHREPUND is 1 for REPUNDWRITING equal 
to 1 and 0 otherwise whereas in specification 4, it is 1 for REPUNDWRITING equal to or 
greater than 0.75 and 0 otherwise. The table shows that the offers with both the offer price in 
the highest quartile and the higher level of representative underwriting pay a significantly 
lower underwriting discount. Specifications 1 and 2 show that the level of representative 
underwriting and the number of representative underwriters are consistent with all previous 
sample results after adjusting for the effects of other variables. The effect of the offer size and 
the top auditor are not statistically significant. This implies that the offer size and the top 
auditor cannot completely explain the underwriting discount. Among variables, the effects of 
offer price per share, underwriter rank, ten-year treasury interest rate, listing exchange and 
prior recent SEOs are significant and robust. The significance of the level of representative 
underwriting is consistent with that of Table V with respect to higher offer price, relative 
offer size and top-ranked underwriter. 
We have tested the significance of the level of representative underwriting in a couple of 
different ways with different subsamples and our results are both economically and 
statistically significant and consistent across subsamples. Additionally, our results of 
sensitivity analysis using multiplicative dummies show that the offers with the higher level of 
representative underwriting but the lower relative offer size pay lower underwriting discount 
to the underwriters. When we control the offer price per share and top-ranked underwriter, 
our results report the consistent significance over two sample periods. As such, based on our 
results, we suggest that the level of representative underwriting is a significant determinant to 
underwriters in demanding their compensation. 
In Table IX, we present the OLS regression results of factors determining the level of 
representative underwriting with our full sample of 783 SEOs from January 1996 until June 
2010. The significant negative coefficients of the offer size, LNSEOAMOUNT, denote that 
the level of representative underwriting is a negative function of the offer size whereas it is 
positively influenced by the offer price of the stock, LNOFFPRICE. The intuition behind the 
negative and positive influence of offer size and offer price, respectively, on the level of 
underwriting is that the larger offer positively affects the inventory risk whereas the higher 
offer price inversely affects uncertainty. This is also consistent with our findings that the 
average SEO amount is significantly lower for the level of representative underwriting equal 
to 1. 
Thus, underwriters tend to underwrite less for those larger offers but tend to raise their 
underwriting share for higher priced offers. For the larger and more uncertain lower priced 
offers, the representative underwriters take more underwriters in the syndicate to reduce their 
inventory risk and promote the successful distribution. When there are larger syndicate sizes, 
the proportion of representative underwriting declines but the representative underwriters 
tend to raise their proportion in the offer when their number increases in the syndicate. The 
significant negative coefficients of the number of total underwriters, NUMTOTUND, and 
significant positive coefficients of the number of representative underwriters, 
NUMREPUND, strongly support our argument. Owing to the higher uncertainty associated 
with the higher level of relative offer sizes, there appears an inverse effect which is 
demonstrated by the significant negative coefficient of RELOFF. 
We include the underwriter rank, UNDRANK, in this specification because we expect that 
the certainty of the higher rank of the lead underwriters in the syndicate motivates the team of 
the representative underwriters to underwrite a larger portion in the offer. The significance of 
the coefficient of UNDRANK fails to support this argument. Because of the broader base and 
confidence of NYSE, and less asymmetric information of offers with a recent prior SEO, 
representative underwriters might get motivation to raise their level of underwriting in offers 
listed in the NYSE and that have a prior SEO. To control their influences, we include the 
dummy variable of NYSE and PRESEO in our specification. Our results show that the 
directions of both the coefficients are consistent with our expectation but their statistical 
significance fails to support it. 
The table also shows that the level of representative underwriting is significantly lower for 
post GFC offers. This supports the intuition that underwriters might expect higher inventory 
risk for the post-GFC offers and might want to reduce that risk by underwriting less in the 
offer. This is in contrast to our findings of lower underwriting discount for post GFC SEOs. 
We may argue that underwriters might want to motivate the issuers by reducing their 
compensation and simultaneously reduce their inventory risk through lowering their level of 
underwriting in the offer. 
This table reports the OLS results of factors influencing the level of representative 
underwriting of 783 US SEOs out of 1,295 SEOs issued by 197 different REITs over the 
period from January 1996 until June 2010. The average level of representative underwriting 
is 81 per cent. The number of complete observations (n) is presented at the last row. Sample 
size reduced to 780 in specification 3 after adjusting for missing variable data in three SEOs. 
The table presents the estimates based on the following regression specification: Equation 4 
The other variables are as defined in Table I. ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance 
at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent coefficients 
and p-values are reported. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper empirically depicts that the level of underwriting by the representative 
underwriters in the syndicate can be a significant determinant to them in demanding their 
compensation. Our results suggest that underwriters place emphasis on both the level of 
underwriting and the level of uncertainty in an offer in determining their compensation. 
Antecedent empirical evidence shows the mixed effect of the underwriter reputation on the 
underwriter remuneration. Our results provide evidence that underwriters may place 
emphasis on their both reputation and volume of underwriting in an offer in determining their 
compensation. The empirical evidence of this paper reconciles the mixed effect of the 
underwriter's reputation on their remuneration by incorporating the uncertainty and the level 
of underwriting along with their reputation in fixing their remuneration. Our findings 
complement the well-documented notion of the economies of scale of the offer size on 
underwriting cost by reporting the statistically significant negative relationship between the 
offer size and the underwriting discount. Our results show that the structure of the 
underwriting syndicate such as the reputation of the lead underwriter, the number of 
underwriters and the level of underwriting in an offer are significant determinants of REIT 
SEO underwriting costs. 
Consistent with the industrial SEOs, by investigating a large sample of REIT SEOs, our 
findings document the declining trend of SEO underwriting costs. It also documents the 
effect of both the post-REIT Modernization Act 1999 and the GFC on underwriting costs and 
confirms that the SEOs floated after 2000 and during post-GFC pay lower compensation to 
underwriters. Overall, the results suggest that issuers can minimize the direct costs of raising 
secondary equity capital by selecting the underwriting syndicate with a higher ranked lead 
underwriter and fewer representatives but who will underwrite the larger proportion of the 
offer in the syndicate. 
The study contributes to the literature by providing the determinants of the direct costs of 
REIT SEOs and more specifically the effect of the level of representative underwriting. It 
also contributes to the literature by providing the determinants of the level of representative 
underwriting. The significance of the level of underwriting in the syndicate complements 
Mola and Loughran (2004) that managers of issuing firms emphasize on the underwriters 
who will aggressively talk up their stock because the aggressive underwriters refrain from 
talking up in favor of the offer unless they get their optimum level of underwriting in the 
offer. The study can directly help both the managers of the issuing firms and the underwriting 
syndicate in bargaining on the underwriting compensation. 
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(REPUNDWRITING) of raising secondary equity capital for US REIT SEOs from January 
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Notes 
1. Pugel and White (1988) and Carter and Dark (1990) report a statistically significant 
negative impact of underwriter's reputation on underwriting spread but Chisty et al. 
(1996) find an insignificant negative effect. Dunbar (1995) also documents a 
significant negative impact on total cost spread, whereas How and Yeo (2000), Butler 
et al. (2005) find an insignificant positive effect on underwriting fees but Lee and 
Masulis (2009) report a significant negative effect on underwriting fees. 
2. Corwin and Schultz (2005) report selling concessions nearly 60 percent, our sample 
shows it as 64 percent. 
3. Horng and Wei (1999) who used EDGAR database for financial footnotes, Howe and 
Jain (2004) for annual reports, Loughran and Ritter (2004) for final IPO prospectuses 
(form 424B4) after 1996, Chung et al. (2005) for selecting their sample period from 
1996 due to availability of some required data in EDGAR since 1996 and Brau et al. 
(2007) for number of primary and secondary shares. 
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